justice, national security, prosperity, domestic tranquility, and fidelity to God. 3 This article covers military rule and confederacy; treatment of theocracy and monarchy is reserved for later work.
Military Rule
During the war of conquest, Joshua is the military leader par excellence. He makes all the decisions about how Israel should fight the war, consulting at times with others but in most respects acting as the sole head of government. In that capacity he 3 Aside from the last criterion, these are roughly similar to the goals set forth in the preamble to the U.S. Constitution: to "establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty." makes no distinction among tribes except for the purpose of suppressing tribal authority.
Property rights are also minimized: the Israelites have little personal wealth and, aside from the tribes located east of the Jordan, do not know what share they will receive in the promised land. Joshua can and does command his forces with the sole objective of achieving Israel's military objectives.
This structure of authority is typical of military rule-a system of government in which power is vested in the armed forces rather than in democratic or other institutions.
In the classic case, a leader comes to prominence during a time of exigency and achieves preeminence by virtue of his success on the field. As the leader consolidates power, existing institutions are circumvented or swept aside. The ruler governs by personality and force of arms, providing only limited scope for political or property rights. These features are characteristic of Israel under Joshua's regime.
The author finds something of value in this system. The Israelites under Joshua are an efficient fighting force, united in the cause of conquering the promised land. They forego their own interests for the greater good, obey the leader's commands without cavil, and avoid falling into disputes with one another. Above all, they are joined in fidelity to God. They do not worship foreign gods; this pernicious practice resumes only after the end of major hostilities and the allocation of the promised land among the tribes.
Despite these advantages, the author argues that military rule cannot form the basis for long-term national governance. The advantages of military rule-unified action, centralized authority, lack of defined property rights, minimal political participation-are no longer so valuable once the emergency is past. Meanwhile the shortcomings of military rule become evident. People need to engage in economically productive activities rather than rely on the spoils of battle for sustenance. They need to establish families, hold property, and control their destinies. Joshua, an ideal leader, recognizes this fact when he distributes the promised land to the tribes according to their inheritances. By establishing property rights along clan or tribal lines, Joshua relinquishes his most important powers. The message is that military rule, although sometimes necessary in war, is not a desirable means for governing the people when the land is at rest.
Having established this proposition, the author needs to clear the way for the analysis of other forms of national government. He does so by eliminating all vestiges of the former regime. Joshua's authority ends with the close of military operations and the distribution of the land. He sends the tribes home to their new territories and retires to his estate at Timnath-Serah (Josh 24:28-30). He designates no successor. And it is not only Joshua who leaves the scene. Joshua's entire administration disappears. His farewell address is clearly intended to mark the end of the era (Josh 23:1-2).
Confederacy
With the departure of Joshua and his war cabinet, practical sovereignty returns to the tribes. The setup allows the author to explore the next model of national government:
an association of semiautonomous tribes sharing a common God, united by legal obligations of support and protection, and led by persons known as "judges."
Organizations of this general type are often referred to as "confederacies." The word is appropriate provided that it does not imply that the association has much in the way of formal structure or that the obligations that constitute it function consistently or well. 
Legal Rights and Duties
Having provided a general account of how reciprocity, shared interest, and power can induce self-interested tribes to cooperate with one another within the framework of a confederacy, the author turns to the analysis of specific institutions. One of these is legal rights and duties.
The covenant at Shechem confirms a mutual obligation of all the tribes to "serve the Lord" (Josh 24:15) . While the full scope of this commitment is unclear, the author suggests that it incorporates six specific duties that the tribes owe to one another. The author there describes how Deborah sits under the palm of Deborah and hears cases 9 Art. IV, cl. 1 of the U.S. Articles of Confederation provided similar protections for travelers by guaranteeing citizens of any state the rights to "all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States" and to "free ingress and regress to and from any other state" (slaves, paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice were excepted). 10 The American analogy is art. IV, cl. 2 of the Articles of Confederation, providing that "if any person guilty of, or charged with, treason, felony, or other high misdemeanor in any State, shall flee from justice, and be found in any of the United States, he shall, upon demand of the Governor or executive power of the State from which he fled, be delivered up and removed to the State having jurisdiction of his offense."
that the people of Israel bring to her for judgment (Judg 4:5) . This and other passages tell us a fair amount about the nature of the office:
(a) The position of forensic judge remains in existence throughout the entire period of the confederacy. This feature is coded in texts reporting that a judge is succeeded in office by another judge (Judg 3:31) or that a judge happens to be serving in office at a particular time (Judg 4:4). The author evidently considers it crucial to establish continuity for the office, as indicated by the fact that he supplies names of "minor" judges whose only role is to confirm that the position persists through time.
(b) Procedures for appointing judges are not spelled out. In at least one case, the official continues in a judicial capacity after having come to power as a military leader (Judg 12:7). Otherwise we know nothing about judicial selection, although we may infer that it was considered important to fill vacancies by distributing the office widely among the tribes.
(c) Judges sit or hold court when deciding matters brought before them (Judg 4:5).
The idea implies that judges do not play an active role in events. The passivity of the judge's role is also suggested by the detail that Deborah hears cases under a palm tree:
the implication is that the forensic task does not require her to move about. Her forensic function, like that of judges today, is only to render judgment, not to execute policy. (e) It is also apparent that judges do not have the power of compulsory process.
Deborah cannot, as judges do today, issue a writ mandating that a party appear in court.
Her jurisdiction is limited to matters presented by mutual agreement of the parties: the Israelites "went to her to have their disputes decided" (Judg 4:5).
(f) The disputes judges adjudicate are likely to be controversies between clans or tribes or between parties from different clans or tribes, because disagreements arising within a group will be resolved by local authorities. This limitation on jurisdiction is consistent with the office of judge as serving a unifying national function: the matters they adjudicate are ones that otherwise could lead to rancor or violence between subnational groups. (f) The military leader invokes the confederacy's guarantee of mutual assistance by calling on other groups to participate. The distinction between using your own group and drawing on national authority is coded in the Gideon story by the media of the call:
Gideon blows a trumpet to summon his own clan (the suggestion is that they are close enough to hear it), but he sends messengers to contact the others (Judg 6:34-35). These texts give us information about the popular assembly:
(a) The institution is only convened in crises that threaten the integrity of the nation. In the first story, the tribes come to the brink of civil war but fall back; in the second, they actually fall into hostilities; in the third, they face the potential loss of one of their members. The lack of other instances in which an assembly is called suggests that it exists for this special purpose only-a reasonable inference given the costs of gathering people from all over the land.
(b) The author provides conflicting information about the guest list at the assembly. In Judg 20:1 it appears that everyone attends: "all the Israelites from Dan to Beersheba and from the land of Gilead came together as one." In the next verse the author seems to limit attendance to the "leaders of all the people of the tribes of Israel" but then expands the roster to include "four hundred thousand soldiers armed with swords" (Judg 20:2). The ambiguity may reflect an attempt to accommodate conflicting narrative goals: the author wishes to include everyone in order to stress the importance as well as the exceptional nature of the event, but he also wants to restrict attendance in order not to endorse a political structure that gives too much power to the masses.
(c) Attendance appears to be mandatory for everyone who is called. The penalty for truancy can be harsh. Before the second assembly concerning the problem with Benjamin, the Israelites take an oath that anyone who does not come will be executed (Judg 21:5). When attendance is taken, it turns out that no one from Jabesh-Gilead has shown up (Judg 21:8). The Israelites descend on the town, kill everyone other than virgin women, and give the latter as wives to the Benjaminites (Judg 21:10-11).
(d) It is not clear what sort of notice or opportunity to be heard is required. In the first story the eastern tribes are not invited. This would suggest that the accused group need not be given notice of the assembly. In the second story, Benjamin is invited (Judg 19:29) but boycotts (Judg 20:3). These differences serve narrative purposes: in the first story, the fact that the eastern tribes have not received notice allows them to pass off the whole contretemps as a huge misunderstanding, whereas in the second story, the fact that Benjamin has received notice and elected not to appear justifies the punitive action undertaken against it. From the standpoint of political theory, the suggestion is that the popular assembly is so unusual that there are no fixed rules as to notice.
(e) The author provides information about the rules of decision at the assembly. In the story of Gibeah, the decision is unanimous: when asked to give their verdict, "all the people rose as one man" (Judg 20:8). In the story of the eastern tribes, the decision rule is not stated, but the emissaries of Israel speak in the name of the "whole assembly" (Josh 22:16), thus suggesting that the decision is made by consensus. In neither case is there any indication that decisions can be made by majority vote.
(f) Even after the assembly meets and elects to take action, the offending party is given the opportunity to rectify the situation without bloodshed. In the story of the eastern tribes, a high-level delegation is sent to demand an explanation and, having received one, returns home satisfied (Josh 22:15-33). In the Gibeah narrative, the assembly sends emissaries throughout Benjamin with the promise that war can be avoided if the wrongdoers are extradited: "Surrender those wicked men of Gibeah so that we may put them to death and purge the evil from Israel" (Judg 20:13). War breaks out only when the proposal receives no response.
(g) It appears that only the assembly has the authority to initiate military action against any of the tribes. We infer this from the fact that the major judges never attack other tribes for violations of tribal obligations (Jephthah's war against Ephraim is based on a personal insult rather than a violation of national duty; see Judg 12:1-6). It also appears that the tribes are obligated to participate in actions decided on by the assembly.
* * *
As in the case of the other institutions of the confederacy, the popular assembly fits within a framework of semiautonomous tribes responding to the incentives of reciprocity, shared interest, and power. The assembly functions as a forum in which all the Israelites can debate what to do. Everyone has the opportunity to be heard. Because decisions must be made by consensus, the tribes are protected, at least to some extent, against being dragged into conflicts that they do not wish to join. And because all are present (except perhaps the accused parties), each tribe is assured that if it participates in the course of action decided by the assembly the others will do the same; this increases security and reduces the danger of free-rider effects.
Evaluation
The author presents a mixed assessment of the confederacy as a form of government. The stories of charismatic military leaders could be viewed in a positive light. Israel is the underdog in these narratives-poorly organized, outgunned, unjustly treated, and possessed of few assets other than the courage of its people, the resourcefulness of its leaders, and the strength that comes from faith in God. And the stories of the judges, like underdog stories everywhere, always result in a satisfying ending: the oppressors are humiliated, the people are liberated, and the rightful order is restored. Other features of the confederacy are also appealing. The tribes are not subject to the oppressive power of leaders. They are not taxed or dragooned into forced labor.
Their obligations are minor and are generally ones that they would agree to in any event.
The political institutions of the confederacy also have virtues. It is clear that the author views the judicial power as necessary and desirable; the most plausible reason why he does not offer much detail about the forensic function is simply that it is not controversial. Similarly, the author sees benefits in the military leader and the popular assembly. Each of these institutions responds to significant problems while respecting the autonomy and integrity of tribal authority.
The subtext of the book of Judges, however, is not so positive. The author's deeper purpose is to critique the system that made it necessary for the judges to arise as saviors in the first place. 14 He makes the following observations:
(a) The confederacy is not ordained, approved, or inspired by God. God's only involvement is through the low-quality medium of an oracle (Judg 1:1); and although the advice the oracle offers proves to be accurate, the answer, as with any oracle, is only as good as the question asked. The Israelites do not ask God for advice as to how they should carry out the campaign on an all-Israel basis. They have apparently already made the decision that the tribes should act on their own. More importantly, they do not ask
God for advice about what sort of political system they should adopt, nor does God offer any. The confederacy is purely the creation of human beings and as such is vulnerable to the weakness and instability that comes when decisions are made by human beings alone without God's input or approval.
(b) The confederacy is grounded on self-interest rather than on a genuine commitment of mutual support and assistance. But reciprocity, shared interest, and power are inherently unstable. Reciprocity can break down when a group that has received assistance fails to repay in kind. Power waxes and wanes and interests shift, and as these changes occur the willingness of the tribes to support one another will shift along with them. The author suggests that there is nothing constant or reliable about the confederacy as a form of government.
(c) The judicial authority, although crucial, is too weak to deliver the benefits of a national government. Because the judges lack the power of compulsory process, they can be bypassed by parties who are unwilling to have their controversies resolved in this forum. The problem becomes severe when one of the parties knows it is in the wrong.
The Levite in Judg 19-21 does not even try to invoke the judicial power against the men of Gibeah, probably because he knows that the wrongdoers will never agree to have the case judged. Even if a judge had adjudicated the matter, moreover, he or she would have had grave difficulty enforcing the judgment, since the wrongdoers could take sanctuary with their kinsmen and refuse to submit.
(d) An even more serious limitation of the judicial power is its passivity. Deborah serves as a judge in Israel, hearing and deciding cases, but she has no power either to prevent her countrymen from worshipping foreign gods or to stop enemies such as Sisera from reducing Israel to penury. Like jurists in the United States, she has "neither force nor will, but merely judgment." 15 It is only when she switches roles and rebrands herself as a military leader that she is able to deal with the threat. The judicial power of the tribal confederacy is thus an essential component of national government, one that may help establish justice in the land, but not nearly sufficient to guarantee the blessings of justice, national security, prosperity, domestic tranquility, and fidelity to God . Ephraim. Not coincidentally, the main Israelite actors are also from these tribes: Deborah comes from Ephraim and Barak is from Naphtali (Judg 4:5-6). In tacit recognition of the fact that other tribes may not want to participate, Deborah initially asks Barak to bring troops only from Zebulun and Naphtali (Judg 4:6). Later, she calls on other tribes to participate, but not all: Levi, Simeon, and Judah are not mentioned, apparently because they are so far away or so scattered that their participation is not even demanded. 16 Of the groups that do receive the call, only some respond. Deborah credits Ephraim, Zebulun, Benjamin, Issachar, Makir, and Naphtali for answering the call in whole or in part (Judg 5:14-15, 18). These groups are close to the problem. She criticizes others for staying away-Reuben, Gilead, Asher, and Dan (Judg 5:15-17). Each of these groups is geographically or economically removed from the problem. 17 The author thus uses this text to critique the tribal confederacy for its inability to overcome free-rider problems and induce cooperation in military operations.
(f) The only means the military ruler has to conquer the free-rider problem is the use of social sanctions of praise or blame. To be effective, such sanctions must be publicized, must be remembered, and must actually influence reputations. The Song of Deborah (Judg 5) addresses all three of these problems.
Deborah is a genius at publicizing her critique. In the absence of television or Twitter, she disseminates her message through the only broadcast medium available:
travelers (Judg 5:10). She also employs the public forums of the ancient Near East, namely, city gates and communal wells: "consider the voice of the singers at the watering places. They recite the victories of the Lord, the victories of his villagers in Israel. Then the people of the Lord went down to the city gates" (Judg 5:10-11).
It is not enough that the message be received; it must also be remembered. The (g) The popular assembly is also of limited value in delivering the benefits of nationhood. It is an unusual event, probably one that only occurs once during a person's lifetime, if that. The author highlights the extraordinary nature of the assembly when he describes the people's reaction to the outrage at Gibeah: "Everyone … was saying, 'Such a thing has never been seen or done, not since the day the Israelites came up out of Egypt.
Just imagine! We must do something!'" (Judg 19:30) . Given the gravity of the provocation that is needed to convene it, the assembly is an inadequate institution for ordinary governance. The decision rules of the assembly also limit its effectiveness. The assembly is unlikely to act in the face of substantial opposition. The author hints that many tribal assemblies do end inconclusively. When the people say, "None of us will go home. No, not one of us will return to his house" (Judg 20:8), they are recognizing that tribal assemblies often wind up with the people simply going home with no action taken. * * * Given these weaknesses of its institutions, it is not surprising that confederacy does not deliver the full benefits of nationhood. The stories of the book of Judges, in fact, read as a compendium of failure:
(a) The confederacy does not prevent apostasy. The problem is not that the people are unusually prone to worship foreign gods under this form of government. As illustrated in the episode of the golden calf, the people are always subject to this temptation. But if impulses are incorrigible, government can at least discourage people from acting them out. It can police against sacrilegious practices, chase away pagan priests, demolish offending altars, and destroy idols. But the confederacy is unable to do these things with any consistency. Neither forensic judges nor the popular assembly is able to deal with the chronic problem of disloyalty to God. Nor are military leaders wellequipped to cope with this problem. Military leaders only arise in times of crisis; they cannot be continuously on the prowl against evil practices. Moreover, these leaders govern by consensus; and on the issue of worshipping foreign gods, consensus may be lacking (Gideon does tear down an offending altar and its asherah, but these items belong to his family, so he can claim a property right to dispose of them as he wishes; even so, the people demand his execution ). in order "to remove it from the Midianites" (Judg 6:11). Even though the Midianites are not a military threat, their economic impact is severe: they "so impoverished the Israelites that they cried out to the Lord for help" (Judg 6:6).
It is true that a charismatic leader releases Israel from this menace. Thus, as in the case of Deborah and Barak, the Gideon narrative could be read to glorify Israel and its hero. But, also as in the previous narrative, the subtext is different. The Midianites trample and steal with impunity. Whoever is judging Israel at the time-we are not told-is incapable of responding. And although Gideon eventually defeats the intruders, Midian is not eradicated. Israel will continue to produce crops and animals and nomadic groups will continue to trespass and pilfer. Gideon has only suppressed but not eliminated the danger. What would suffice to thwart an enemy like Midian? The author suggests that the key is deterrence. Nomadic groups must be frightened to the point that they will not is not accidental; the author is arguing that under the confederacy, Israel is threatened on all sides. The subtext is the same as in the narratives having to do with trade and commerce. It is true that in each case the Israelites are delivered by a heroic judge-a good thing. But the rescues would not have been needed if the Israelites had not been oppressed in the first place. And these victories come at a cost-as illustrated in the story of Jephthah, who loses his only child as the price for winning a battle .
Between the lines, the author is saying that the confederacy is inadequate as a means for delivering security.
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(e) The confederacy does not protect property rights. Micah, a resident of Ephraim, hires an ambitious Levite from Bethlehem to serve as priest in his household, paying him a nice salary (ten shekels a year) plus benefits (food and a change of clothes;
Judg 17:7-13). But Micah does not get references. The employee proves unscrupulous when offered a better job elsewhere, running away and helping his new employers to steal valuables from his former master . Micah catches the thieves, but they insolently rebuff and threaten him: "Don't argue with us, or some of the men may get angry and attack you, and you and your family will lose your lives" (Judg 18:25). The message is that the confederacy does not protect Israelite households against violence or thefts committed by travelers.
Later, the Danites attack the town of Laish, kill the inhabitants, rename the place after themselves, and settle down. This text is in part a polemic against Jereboam's construction of a sanctuary in Dan to compete with the temple in Jerusalem. But it also has a more general message. The territory of Laish is not part of Dan's tribal allocation, nor is its seizure sanctioned by God. The author is clear that the Danites are wrong to displace the people from their lands. 22 The message is that the confederacy is unable to protect real property against expropriation by groups with the power, organization, and mobility to dispossess the former inhabitants.
(f) The confederacy does not protect travelers. The outrage at Gibeah is a prooftext: the people of that town commit heinous crimes against inoffensive wayfarers who have stopped for the night. The crime is eventually punished, but this will not bring the victim back or provide much assurance for the future.
(g) The confederacy does not ensure extradition. Judges 20 reports that Benjamin did not comply with its obligation to turn over the criminals in its midst even when ordered to do so by the assembly. Although Benjamin is eventually called to account for its misconduct, the subtext is that confederacy lacks effective means for dealing with the tendency to give sanctuary to members of one's own group. More generally, the message is that relationships of tribes to one another are likely to be imperiled due to the lack of an effective nationwide system of criminal justice.
(h) Finally, and worst of all, the confederacy does not prevent civil war. 23 The conflict between Benjamin and the rest of Israel results in twenty-five thousand casualties for Benjamin alone (Judg 20:46) . Even the spat between Jephthah and Ephraim generates 22 The author is unclear as to the identity of the Laishites, the people dispossessed by the Danites. He tells us only who they are not: they live "according to the customs of the Sidonians" but are not members of that group, and they have no dealings with Aram (Judg 18:9). But perhaps they are Israelites or affiliated with Israel; if so, the Danite assault is particularly reprehensible. Even if they are foreigners, the author is sympathetic, referring to them as a "quiet and trusting people" (Judg 19:27)-an inoffensive group who have long lived securely in a broad and fertile land. 23 The possibility of strife among the states under confederate government was also a theme of The Federalist Papers. See The Federalist No. 5 (Jay).
